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 Abstract  The nuclear accident that occurred at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear 
Power Plant on March 11, 2011 was caused by the extremely massive earthquake 
and gigantic tsunami, which resulted in a severe accident that extended over multi-
ple reactors simultaneously. In the present chapter the current status of the accident 
is described in terms of basic information, sequences of the accident, fi ssion prod-
ucts (FP) released, and lessons learned. Although some details of the accident are 
still not well known, the sequences, causes, and consequences of the accidents have 
been basically clarifi ed by the efforts of several investigation committees in Japan. 
The fi ssion products released to the environment were estimated by the severe acci-
dent analysis code, MELCOR, from inside the reactor core, and also by the atmo-
spheric dispersion simulations code, SPEEDI, by coupling with environmental 
monitoring data in the reverse estimation method from outside the plant. The esti-
mated release amount of  131 I is of the order of 120–160 PBq and that of  137 Cs is of 
the order of 8–15 PBq for both estimations. Lessons learned from the accident iden-
tifi ed by the investigation committees cover a wide spectrum of insuffi cient mea-
sures, such as for earthquake and tsunami, station blackout, severe accident 
management, common cause accident at multiple unit site, education and training, 
chain of command at the accident, disaster prevention, and safety regulation sys-
tems. These lessons should be shared all over the world for the higher level of safety 
assurance of current reactors, and advanced reactors without the need of evacuation 
in principle should be developed for future. 
 Keywords  Fukushima Daiichi •  Severe accident •  Fission product •  Lessons 
learned 
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3.1  Introduction 
 The nuclear accident that occurred at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant 
(NPP) of Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO) on March 11, 2011 was caused by an 
extremely massive earthquake, the Great East Japan Earthquake, and a gigantic tsu-
nami rarely seen in history, which resulted in the severe accident that extended over 
multiple reactors simultaneously. Although some details of the accident are still not 
well known, the sequences, causes, and consequences of the accidents have been 
basically clarifi ed by the efforts of investigation committees, such as Independent 
Investigation Commission [ 1 ], TEPCO’s Investigation Committee [ 2 ], National 
Diet’s Investigation Committee [ 3 ] and Government’s Investigation Committee [ 4 ]. 
The fi ssion products (FPs) released to the environment were estimated by the severe 
accident analysis code from inside the reactor core, and also by atmospheric disper-
sion simulation code by coupling with environmental monitoring data in the reverse 
estimation method from outside the plant. Lessons learned from the accident are 
identifi ed mostly by those investigation committees, which cover the wide spectrum 
of insuffi cient measures in hardware, software, management, and regulation [ 1 – 4 ]. 
In the present chapter, the current status of the accident is described in terms of 
basic information, sequences of the accident, estimated fi ssion products released, 
and lessons learned from the accident. 
3.2  Basic Information 
 The Fukushima Daiichi NPP is located in the towns of Okuma and Futaba, which 
are in the county of Futaba in Fukushima Prefecture. This NPP consists of six boil-
ing water reactors (BWR) installed, Units 1 through 6, with a total generating 
capacity of 4,696 MWe (Table  3.1 ). The reactor model of Unit 1 is BWR3, that of 
Unit 2 through 4 is BWR4, and that of Unit 5 and 6 is BWR5. The Primary 
Containment Vessel (PCV) model of Unit 1 through 5 is Mark-1 and that of Unit 6 
is Mark-2, respectively. Before the earthquake on March 11, Units 1 through 3 were 
under operation and Units 4 through 6 were undergoing periodic inspection. Unit 4 
was undergoing a major construction for renovations, with all the nuclear fuel in the 
 Table 3.1  Major characteristics of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant 
 Unit  1  2  3  4  5  6 
 Electric output (MWe)  460  784  784  784  784  1,100 
 Commercial operation  1971/3  1974/7  1976/3  1978/4  1978/4  1979/10 
 Reactor model  BWR3  BWR4  BWR4  BWR4  BWR  BWR5 
 PCV model  Mark-1  Mark-1  Mark-1  Mark-1  Mark-1  Mark-2 
 No. of fuel assemblies 
in core 
 400  548  548  548  548  764 
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reactor pressure vessel (RPV) having already been transferred to the spent fuel pool. 
More details on the plant specifi cations and initial and boundary conditions are 
described in  2 ].
3.3  Accident Sequences 
3.3.1  Before the Tsunami Attack 
 The Pacifi c Coast area of eastern Japan was struck off the Tohoku District by the 
Pacifi c Ocean Earthquake, which occurred at 14:46 on March 11, 2011. This earth-
quake occurred in an area where the Pacifi c plate sinks beneath the North American 
plate. The magnitude of the earthquake was 9.0, the greatest in Japan’s recorded 
history. Within seconds of the earthquake, the reactor was shut down in all three 
operating units with the insertion of control rods. The turbo-generators also tripped, 
and main steam isolation valves closed. All power supplied from a total of six exter-
nal power supply lines connected to the power plant stopped as a result of damage 
to the breakers and collapse of the power transmission line tower caused by the 
earthquake. The earthquake thus disrupted the electrical supply from the grid, 
which resulted in a loss of offsite power for all six units. As designed, the emer-
gency diesel generators (EDGs) started providing essential power for all safety sys-
tems, including the residual heat removal system. Up to the present time, major 
damage to the reactor facilities that are important for safety functions has not yet 
been identifi ed [ 1 – 4 ]. 
3.3.2  After the Tsunami Attack 
 Fukushima Daiichi was hit by the fi rst enormous tsunami at 15:27 on March 11, and 
the next enormous wave was around 15:35. The license for the establishment of 
nuclear reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi was based on the assumption that the 
maximum design basis tsunami height expected was 3.1 m. The assessment in 2002 
based on the “Tsunami Assessment Method for Nuclear Power Plants in Japan” 
proposed by the Japan Society of Civil Engineers indicated a maximum water level 
of 5.7 m, and TEPCO raised the height of its Unit 6 seawater pump in response to 
this assessment. However, the height of the tsunami this time was 14 to 15 m, and 
all EDGs and the power panels installed in the basements of the reactor buildings 
and turbine buildings, except one air-cooled diesel generator for Unit 6, were inun-
dated and stopped functioning (Table  3.2 ): this resulted in a station blackout (SBO) 
event for Units 1 through 4. All station DC powers (batteries) were also lost at Units 
1, 2, and 4 because of the tsunami, but some DC power survived initially at Unit 3. 
The tsunami also damaged the coolant intake structures, the seawater pumps for 
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auxiliary cooling systems, and turbine and reactor buildings, resulting in a loss of 
ultimate heat sink for all six units. It took 9 days to restore offsite power to the site.
 TEPCO’s operators followed their manuals for severe accidents and attempted to 
secure power supplies to recover equipment within the safety systems, such as core- 
cooling and water-injection systems, which had automatically started up. However, 
ultimately power supplies could not be recovered. Because the core-cooling func-
tions using AC power were lost in Units 1 through 3, core-cooling systems without 
need of AC power were put into operation: the isolation condenser (IC) in Unit 1, 
reactor core isolation cooling system (RCIC) in Unit 2, and RCIC and high-pressure 
injection system (HPCI) in Unit 3. Schematics of IC and RCIC systems are shown 
in Figs.  3.1 and  3.2 , respectively. These core-cooling systems, which do not need 
AC power, stopped functioning thereafter, and were switched to alternative injec-
tions of freshwater or seawater by fi re-extinguishing lines, using fi re engine pumps. 
In Units 1 through 3, because water injection to each reactor core was impossible to 
continue for several hours, the nuclear fuels were not covered by water but were 
exposed to the steam, leading to a core melt situation. It is believed that part of the 
melted fuel stayed at the bottom of the RPV. The main causes of the damage during 
the accident are illustrated in Fig.  3.3 . More details on the accident sequences of 
Units 1 through 3 are described in the following sections [ 3 ].
3.3.3  Accident Sequence of Unit 1 
 For Unit 1, the emergency core cooling was provided by isolation condensers (ICs). 
In the primary side of the IC, steam from the main steam line is condensed and the 
water is returned to the RPV via the recirculation line (see Fig.  3.1 ). The secondary 
side of the IC is cooled by the plant demineralizer, with a minimum water supply for 
6 h before makeup is required in the design. However, the ICs for Unit 1 ceased 
operation within an hour of the SBO event. Because the core cooling was lost rela-
tively early after the SBO, the accident sequence was rather simple. It is presumed 
that the accident resulted in core melting, RPV failure, and core melt drop on the 
 Table 3.2  Summary of damage after tsunami attack 
 Unit  1  2  3  4  5  6 
 Operation status  Full-power operation  Under inspection 
 Off-site power  ×  ×  ×  ×  ×  × 
 Emergency diesel generator  ×  ×  ×  ×  ×  × 
 A: Air-cooled  ×  × A  ×  × A  ×  О A 
 × 
 Emergency power panel  ×  ×  ×  ×  ×  О 
 Normal power panel  ×  ×  ×  ×  ×  × 
 DC power source  ×  ×  О  ×  О  О 
 Seawater cooling pump  ×  ×  ×  ×  ×  × 
J. Sugimoto
21
 Fig. 3.1  Schematic diagram of isolation condenser (IC).  RPV , reactor pressure vessel 
 Fig. 3.2  Schematic diagram of reactor core isolation cooling system (RCIC) 
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containment vessel fl oor at the shortest time of the accident sequence. With little 
core cooling expected in these situations, at about 2.5 h after the SBO, the core 
water level dropped to the upper core location as a result of overheating of the core, 
at about 4 h zirconium water chemical reaction heavily progressed, and at about 
4.5 h core melt probably initiated. With the progression of the core melt, the core 
melt temperature increased above 2,500°C; rare gas and volatile fi ssion products, 
such as iodine, and cesium, were vaporized from the core and were released to the 
vapor phase in the RPV. It is estimated that RPV failure occurred near the lower 
head as a result of the relocation of the core melt into the RPV lower plenum. It is 
estimated that this happened at about 02:45 on March 12 when RPV pressure and 
containment drywell (D/W) pressure became nearly the same value, as shown in 
Fig.  3.4 ; this resulted in releases of high-temperature and high-pressure steam and 
volatile fi ssion products into the containment D/W from RPV. Because this released 
steam was much higher in temperature and pressure steam than the design tempera-
ture and pressure of the containment vessel, gaskets at the fl anges, hatches, airlocks, 
and penetrations of the containment were degraded, resulting in the loss of leak-
tightness of the containment. Hydrogen explosions at Unit 1 and Unit 3 indicate that 
a large amount of hydrogen along with FPs and steam was released into the reactor 
building from the containment vessel. FPs released into the reactor building were 
considered to be released to the environment mostly as a result of the hydrogen 
explosion.




 It is estimated that the most of the core melt dropped on the containment fl oor 
at about 04:00 on March 12, and molten core–concrete interaction (MCCI) 
occurred by abrading the concrete of the containment fl oor underneath. However, 
the molten core was fi nally cooled by the injected cooling water during the acci-
dent. It is still quite unknown where and in what state the core debris exists in the 
containment. 
 As shown in Fig.  3.4 , the pressure of D/W after about 01:00 on March 12 was 
more than 0.7 MPa, which is much higher than the design pressure of the contain-
ment, and this was the critical situation for the containment integrity. At about 14:30 
the operators successfully conducted containment suppression chamber (S/C) vent-
ing under the poor working conditions. This effort caused drastic decrease of D/W 
pressure, and containment rupture at the initial stage of the accident could be 
avoided. However, more than 13 h was required to actually conduct S/C venting. 
This large delay in S/C venting is one of the reasons that hydrogen explosion and FP 
release to the environment could not be prevented. Because the pressure of RPV 
decreased to about 0.8 MPa at about 02:45 on March 12, it was possible to inject 
water into the RPV by using fi re engines. However, it took some more time for pre-
paring the water injection because of the equipment damages and chaos caused by 
the earthquake and tsunami. The water injection was actually conducted at 05:46 on 
March 12. The water injection rate was not adequate, only about 1 t/h until about 
07:00. However, it is estimated that if this water had not been injected, the core melt 
would probably have abraded through the containment vessel bottom and the core 
melt might directly interact with groundwater. 
 Fig. 3.4  Accident sequence of Unit 1 
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3.3.4  Accident Sequence of Unit 2 
 After the SBO, RCIC of Unit 2 was functioning. However, until about 10:00 on 
March 14, more than 3 h earlier than the RCIC stop time, the water level of the RPV 
was decreasing and the pressure of RPV was increasing. It is believed that this trend 
shows that RCIC was losing its core-cooling capability. At the central control room, 
operators tried to rapidly depressurize RPV by opening the safety relief valves, and 
it was only possible after 5 to 6 h because of the delay for preparing batteries. The 
reason of this delay was the immediate chaos caused by the hydrogen explosion at 
Unit 3, resulting in much time needed to prepare the large amount of batteries. 
When the depressurization was initiated by opening the safety valves, the RPV 
water level was almost half of the core. The water level then reached to the bottom 
of the core, resulting in the loss of water in the core region. 
 As shown in Fig.  3.5 , the increase of D/W pressure initiated after about 19:00 on 
March 14, and it showed almost the same value as the RPV pressure, which indi-
cates the occurrence of the RPV failure. After the RPV pressure and D/W pressure 
increased with values similar to each other, they remained at the high values of 0.6 
to 0.7 MPa for more than 7 h, which is much higher than the design pressure 
(0.427 MPa). Around this time, FPs in the RPV were released into D/W, which is 
indicated by the rapidly increased dose rate in D/W (Fig.  3.5 ). Through the fl anges, 
hatches, airlocks, and penetrations with gaskets degraded by the high temperature 
and high pressure of the containment, hydrogen and volatile fi ssion products, such 
as iodine, and cesium, were released to the reactor building, a similar phenomenon 
as the hydrogen explosion process in Units 1 and 3. It is believed that the opening 




of the blowout panel on the roof of the reactor building caused by the impact of the 
hydrogen explosion of Unit 3 prevented the occurrence of the hydrogen explosion 
of Unit 2.
 The pressures of D/W and RPV both rapidly decreased from 0.65 MPa from 
about 07:00 to 11:00 on March 15. Especially, the pressure of D/W decreased to 
atmospheric pressure. This rapid decrease indicates that a relatively large failure 
occurred in D/W. It is therefore shows that a large amount of gases including a high 
level of radioactive materials in D/W was released into the reactor building in a 
short period because of the loss of containment leak-tightness. Also, sharp synchro-
nized peaks were observed for both RPV and D/W pressures after the immediate 
decrease of D/W pressure. RPV pressure decreased and then rapidly increased to 
0.65 MPa, which is almost before the rapid decrease, and then it rapidly decreased. 
The peak value of D/W pressure is about half of the RPV pressure spike, but they 
are almost synchronized and the shape is similar. This rapid increase and decrease 
of RPV pressure shows that the large amount of steam was generated in a very short 
period in RPV, and it was released to the D/W side and then released to reactor 
building through failure location of D/W. It is considered that the large amount of 
steam generated was the result of direct contact of core melt relocated to the lower 
plenum of RPV with the remaining water there. It is assumed that a new rupture of 
relatively large size was formed at the lower head of the RPV. It should be noted that 
containment venting was tried three times to depressurize the containment, but all 
attempts were unsuccessful. 
3.3.5  Accident Sequence of Unit 3 
 In Unit 3, RCIC was operated using surviving DC power at 16:03 on March 11 after 
SBO. This RCIC was stopped at 11:36 on March 12. HPCI was automatically acti-
vated by the signal of “RPV low water level” at 12:35 on March 12. After the HPCI 
operation the PRV pressure, which once reached about 7.5 MPa, decreased to 
4.8 MPa at 12:05, and 3.5 MPa at 14:25, 0.8 MPa at about 20:00, and 0.58 MPa at 
2:42 on March 13 when HPCI was stopped (Fig.  3.6 ). The RPV pressure increased 
again to 4.0 MPa at 1 h and 7.38 MPa at 2 h after HPCI stopped. The RPV pressure 
rapidly decreased from 7.3 to 0.46 MPa at 8:55 on March 13 from opening of safety 
relief valves. At the same time, D/W pressure rapidly increased to 0.537 MPa, 
which is nearly the same as the RPV pressure, because of the infl ow of high- 
temperature and high-pressure coolant. Because the D/W pressure was higher than 
the design pressure of the containment, 0.427 MPa, containment S/C venting was 
immediately conducted. D/W pressure decreased rapidly, but the opening of the 
venting was unstable and the opening began closing in a short time. Opening and 
closing of the venting were thus iterated fi ve times. During this period RPV pressure 
and D/W pressure rapidly increased and decreased. Rapid increase of RPV pressure 
indicates a large amount of steam generation, which implies the existence of the 
core melt. The rapid decrease of both RPV pressure and D/W pressure clearly 
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indicates the effectiveness of the S/C containment venting for the depressurization 
of the containment. In contrast to Unit 2, the containment pressure of Unit 3 did not 
remain above 0.6 MPa for a long time because of the multiple depressurizations. 
Just after the fourth venting at 11:01 on March 14, the hydrogen explosion occurred 
at the reactor building. This explosion indicates that a large amount of hydrogen 
along with radioactive materials and steam was released to the reactor building, and 
the radioactive materials were released to the environment.
3.3.6  Spent Fuel Pools 
 In Unit 4, all core fuels had been transferred to the spent fuel pool for periodic 
inspection before the earthquake. The urgent task at the site, along with recovery of 
the power supply and the continuation of water injection into reactor vessels, was 
injection of water into the spent fuel pools. In the spent fuel pool in each unit, the 
water level continued to drop because of evaporation of the water caused by the heat 
of the spent fuel in the absence of the pool water cooling caused by the loss of power 
supply. Water injection to the spent fuel pool was conducted by the Self-Defense 
Forces, the Fire and Disaster Management Agency, and the National Police Agency, 
using helicopters and water cannon trucks. Concrete pump trucks were ultimately 
utilized, which led to stable water injection using freshwater from nearby reservoirs 
after the initial seawater injection. It is confi rmed that the water level was never 
lower than the top of the fuel in any of the pools, and none of the pools suffered any 




signifi cant structural damage [ 2 ], in contrast to concerns raised during the weeks 
following the accident. The spent fuel pool, storing 1,500 fuel assemblies, was 
designed such that the fuel elements would retain integrity for 30 days without 
active cooling. 
3.4  Release of Fission Products 
 The Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) and the Nuclear Safety 
Commission (NSC) estimated the total amount of radioactive materials released to 
the environment. NISA estimated the total discharged amount from reactors on the 
basis of the analytical results with severe accident analysis code, MELCOR, by 
Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization (JNES) [ 5 ,  6 ], as typically shown in 
Fig.  3.7 . The NSC estimated the amount of nuclides discharged into the atmosphere 
with the assistance of the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) [ 7 ,  8 ] through 
inverse calculations, based on the data of environmental monitoring and atmo-
spheric diffusion calculation code, SPEEDI, as shown in Fig.  3.8 . The estimated 
values summarized in Table  3.3 range between 1.2 and 1.6 × 10 17 Bq for iodine-131 
and 8 and 15 × 10 16 Bq for cesium-137. Values estimated by TEPCO are also shown 
in Table  3.3 . Estimated release of iodine-131 by TEPCO is about three times larger 
than values by NISA or NSC. It is also noted that the estimated releases of iodine-131 
 Fig. 3.7  Estimated fi ssion products (FP) release ratio to the environment with MELCOR code 
(Unit 2).  Solid lines and  dotted lines represent cumulative release fraction and release rate, respec-
tively [ 6 ] 
 
3 Accident of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant…
28
and cesium-137 of the Chernobyl accident [ 9 ] are about one order of magnitude 
larger and about 6 to 10 times larger than those estimated by NISA and NSC as 
shown in Table  3.3 .
 It may be noted that the containment S/C venting is conducted through several 
meters of water depth in a suppression chamber, and the effectiveness of this pool 
scrubbing for FP aerosols is usually very high, of the order of 10 3 as a decontamina-
tion factor. The estimation of FP release during S/C venting by TEPCO for Units 1 
and 3 is not necessarily high compared with other periods [ 2 ]. 
 Fig. 3.8  Estimated FP release to the environment with SPEEDI code 
 Table 3.3  Estimated 
fi ssion products released 
to the environment 
 Organization  131 I (10 15 Bq)  137 Cs (10 15 Bq) 
 NSC/JAEA (August 2011) a  130  11 
 JAEA (March 2012) a  120  9 
 NISA/JNES (June 2011) b  160  15 
 NISA/JNES (February 2012) b  150  8.2 
 TEPCO (June 2012) a  500  10 
 Chernobyl Accident a  1,760  85 
 
a
 Estimated with environmental monitoring data and diffusion 
analysis (SPEEDI/DIANA, etc.) 
 
b





3.5  Lessons Learned 
 After the accident at Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant, several investigation committees 
have been established, such as by the Independent Investigation Commission, 
TEPCO’s Investigation Committee, National Diet’s Investigation Committee, and 
Government’s Investigation Committee. They have issued investigation reports on 
the causes of the disaster, major lessons learned from the accident, and recommen-
dations for the future [ 1 – 4 ]. Most of those reports judged that although the accident 
was triggered by a massive force of nature, it showed existing weaknesses regarding 
defense against natural hazards, regulatory oversight, and insuffi cient accident man-
agement, emergency response, and emergency training that allowed the occurrence 
and escalation of the accident [ 10 ]. 
 For example, the Independent Investigation Commission [ 1 ] mentioned that the 
Fukushima accident is a “man-made disaster–unprepared nuclear severe accident” 
because of ambiguous private corporate management by TEPCO under the national 
nuclear policy. It states that the main cause of the accident is complete lack of crisis 
management and leadership in both the Government and TEPCO. It also empha-
sized the utmost importance for resilience to be greatly enhanced for the future. 
TEPCO’s Investigation Committee [ 2 ] mentions that enhanced accident measures 
both in hardware and in software are to be prepared, and recommends that the 
Government clearly establishes the standards of the emergency offsite center and 
guidelines of external events that have extremely low probabilities and high conse-
quences. It emphasized the importance of the company-wide enhancement of risk 
management systems. National Diet’s Investigation Committee [ 3 ] raises several 
recommendations, such as monitoring of the nuclear regulatory body by the National 
Diet, reform of the crisis management system, Government’s responsibility for pub-
lic health and welfare, and development of a system of independent investigation 
commissions in the National Diet. The Government’s Investigation Committee [ 4 ] 
points out several important recommendations, such as establishment of a basic 
stance for safety measures and emergency preparedness, safety measures regarding 
nuclear power generation, nuclear emergency response systems, harmonization 
with international practices in nuclear safety, and continued investigation of the 
accident causes and damage of the Fukushima accident. 
 Several measures, such as enhanced power supply capabilities, improved severe 
accident management policies, and strengthened emergency preparedness capabili-
ties, have already been put in place based on the identifi ed causes and lessons 
learned from the accident, and some mid-/long-term measures, such as a fi ltered 
containment venting system and increased seawall, are being implemented at 
nuclear power plant sites. Also, it is pointed out that professional leadership in 
nuclear organizations that manage potentially hazardous activities to maintain the 
risk to people and the environment as low as reasonably achievable without com-
promise is of utmost importance, thereby assuring stakeholder trust [ 10 ]. 
 The underlying essential lesson will be that a sense of crisis and tension toward 
a possible severe accident were completely lacking, and groundless overconfi dence 
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against nuclear safety covered all nuclear sectors in Japan. Also it is evident that 
fully fl exible resilience by the maximum use of existing hardware and software with 
enhanced knowledge, experience, monitors, predictive capability, exercises, and 
management is the only possible way to effectively cope with “unexpected” events 
that are largely beyond design base. We should learn these important lessons with 
humility, share them among all throughout the world, and refl ect on them to a future 
even higher level of safety for current nuclear reactors. Because long-term reloca-
tion completely destroys local communities, advanced reactors without the need of 
evacuation, in principle, should be developed and deployed for the future. Associated 
important severe accident research items are being systematically identifi ed, for 
example, by the efforts of the Atomic Energy Society of Japan [ 11 ]. 
 Lastly, it may be noted that the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) has been 
newly established in September 2012, as an independent commission body that 
solely exercises regulatory authority in the fi eld of nuclear safety and security in 
Japan. As of July 2013, only 2 units of about 50 units are in operation, although the 
Government is expecting the restart of the operation of idling nuclear power plants, 
after satisfying new safety regulation rules [ 12 ] in force by the NRA in July 2013, 
as an important power source. 
3.6  Summary 
 1.  Although some details of the accidents of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power 
Plant are still not well known, the sequences, causes, and consequences of the 
accidents have been basically clarifi ed by the efforts of several investigation 
committees established in Japan. 
 2.  The fi ssion products released to the environment were estimated by the severe 
accident analysis code from inside the reactor core, and also by the atmospheric 
dispersion simulations code by coupling with environmental monitoring data in 
the reverse estimation method from outside the plant. The estimated release 
amount of  131 I is of the order of 120–160 PBq, and that of  137 Cs is of the order of 
8–15 PBq for both estimations. 
 3.  Lessons learned from the accident identifi ed by investigation committees cover 
a wide spectrum of insuffi cient measures, such as for earthquake and tsunami, 
station blackout, severe accident management, common cause accident at mul-
tiple unit sites, education and training, chain of command at the accident, disas-
ter prevention, and safety regulation system. These lessons should be shared all 
over the world for the higher level of safety assurance of current reactors, and 
advanced reactors without the need of evacuation in principle should be devel-
oped for the future. 
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